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This paper explores the concept of grace in etiquette as a social 
aesthetic. Etiquette is often understood as distinct from ethics 
because it is perceived as a mere conventional rule following, and a 
matter of style. Alternatively, it may be understood as a form of 
civility that has a social and moral basis that is unrelated to aesthetics. 
This paper argues that the contemporary term ‘gracious’ is both a 
moral and aesthetic evaluation. To do so, I explore the relationship 
between etiquette, virtue, and ethics through the theoretical frames of 
Erving Goffman’s concepts of deference and demeanour, and 
Confucian ethics. Using the example of a disrupted lunch party in 
Agatha Christie’s The Hollow (1946), I show how etiquette 
expresses social relationships and moral obligations through the 
sensual qualities of food. Gracious behaviour does not simply 
involve the observance the codes of socially acceptable behaviour 
but also requires a mastery of, and improvisation on, them to express 
attitudes and relationships. 
 
Introduction 
There are numerous definitions of etiquette, most of which focus on its nature 
as social convention, and in particular, in terms of rules or codes of behaviour. 
Many definitions focus on the fact that such rules are particular to a class or 
group of people. The Oxford English Dictionary, for instance, defines etiquette 
as:  
 
The conventional rules of personal behaviour in polite society; the 
prescribed ceremonial of a court; the formalities required in 
diplomatic discourse; the order of procedure established by custom 
in the armed services, Parliament, etc; the unwritten code restricting 
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professionals in what concerns the interests of their colleagues or the 
dignity of their profession.1  
 
Other definitions of etiquette emphasise its role in everyday interpersonal 
relations. Shirley Yeung defines etiquette as “a body of rules concerning proper 
conduct in everyday encounters” 2  and Ron Scapp and Brian Seitz as 
“prescriptions governing comportment in life’s ordinary interactions.”3 In this 
paper I shall adopt Erving Goffman’s definition of etiquette, because it 
suggests that codes of behaviour focussed on interpersonal relations are a 
subset of ceremonial rules. Goffman defines etiquette as	  ceremonial rules that 
guide “conduct in matters felt to have secondary or even no significance in 
their own right,” “having their primary importance … as a conventionalized 
means of communication by which the individual expresses his character or 
conveys his appreciation of the other participants in the situation.”4  
Etiquette is a form of social aesthetics. It is ‘social’ in that it is based on 
shared or conventional codes and concerned with interpersonal or social 
relations, and ‘aesthetic’ in that the conventions or ceremonies of etiquette 
have aesthetic qualities. These qualities might include ‘grandeur’, which may 
be appropriate to a ceremony such as the opening of parliament or a high court; 
or ‘splendour’, which may be appropriate for a ceremony such as the wedding 
of a member of a royal family, or a university graduation ceremony; or 
‘elegance’, which might be applied to a formal meal. In this paper I intend to 
explore the quality of graciousness as an ideal of etiquette in interpersonal 
relations. I focus on the aesthetic quality of graciousness, in part because the 
majority of the literature on etiquette is focussed on interpersonal behaviour 
and communications, and in part because an exploration of graciousness 
provides a counter-example to the suggestion that the observance of etiquette 
necessarily involves the following of rules. In doing so, this paper contributes 
to the philosophical literature on aesthetics by showing that etiquette is 
evaluated in aesthetic terms, and that this aesthetic evaluation is intimately 
related to ethics.  
                                                
1 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “etiquette.” 
2 Shirley Yeung, “Natural Manners: Etiquette, Ethics and Sincerity in American 
Conduct Manuals”, in Ordinary Ethics: Anthropology, Language and Action, ed. 
Michael Lambek (Bronx: Fordham University Press, 2010), 242. 
3 Ron Scapp and Brian Seitz, Etiquette: Reflection on Contemporary Comportment 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 2. 
4  Erving Goffman, “The Nature of Deference and Demeanor,” American 
Anthropologist 58:3 (1956): 475-499, 475. 
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In ancient Greece, virtue was connected with aesthetics through the 
notion of ‘grace’ or charis. Bonnie McLachlan has argued that charis was both 
an aesthetic and a moral concept central to social order. Charis was based in 
favour, gratitude and thanks, repayment, pleasure, and reciprocity. Examples 
include requesting forgiveness and reconciliation, thanking people, rhetoric, 
and persuasion.5 As such, it should be considered as one element of the 
ceremonial rituals discussed by Goffman, in particular the element of 
demeanour, or the manner in which one presents oneself. In contemporary 
Western societies the term ‘grace’ has both religious and secular meanings. As 
it is used here, the term describes a secular, aesthetic quality: something that 
has grace is pleasing, attractive, or charming. The term may be applied to the 
proportions of a thing, to the ease or refinement of a physical movement, but 
also to social engagement and a person’s manner, behaviour, or expression. To 
describe something as graceful or gracious is to suggest that it is beautiful.  
The aesthetic qualities of etiquette are generally either completely 
overlooked or derided in academic literature. A literature search using 
‘etiquette’ as a key word throws up a vast amount of text on business and 
medical etiquette, as well as other manuals of polite behaviour. In philosophy, 
the term is rarely used except as a counterpoint to definitions of ethics; indeed, 
the codes of etiquette are often derided as ornamental and superficial, as 
opposed to (or beyond) ethical considerations.6 Judith Martin—the author of 
the syndicated Miss Manners columns—and Gunter S. Stent suggest that 
contemporary philosophers are contemptuous of etiquette, citing Philippa 
Foot’s comparison of the imperatives of morality and those of etiquette, in 
which she dismissed the latter as “silly rules” as if their lack of value was a 
self-evident truth.7 Louis P. Pojman’s introduction to ethics distinguishes ethics 
from etiquette on the basis that etiquette concerns “form or style” rather than 
“the essence of social existence,” and determines whether behaviour is polite, 
rather than right “in a deeper sense.”8 A literature search using the keywords of 
‘etiquette and aesthetics’ brings up six results, none of which are academic 
sources. As far as I can establish, the relationship between the concepts of 
aesthetics and etiquette, and in particular the nature of gracious behaviour, is 
                                                
5 Bonnie McLachlan, The Age of Grace: Charis in Early Greek Poetry (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993). 
6 An exception to this disregard can be found in Scapp and Seitz, Etiquette. 
7 Philippa Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” [1972], cited 
in Judith Martin and Gunter S. Stent, “I Think; Therefore I Thank: A Philosophy of 
Etiquette,” The American Scholar (2001): 237-254, 238. 
8 Louis P. Pojman, Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 5th edn. 
(Belmont CA: Wadsworth, 2007), 3. 
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occasionally mentioned in passing in some of the philosophical literature on 
social aesthetics, but has not been analysed. 
I will argue that all observances of the rules of etiquette involve the 
manipulation of sensory qualities of life such as colour, texture, loudness, and 
taste as expressive responses. A second, aesthetic aspect of etiquette concerns 
‘appropriateness’ or a kind of fit between the world, other people, and a 
person’s behaviour. Nevertheless—as indicated by the above suggestion that 
the manner in which codes of etiquette are followed is evaluated 
aesthetically—gracious behaviour does not simply involve the observance the 
codes of socially acceptable behaviour but also requires a mastery of, and 
improvisation on, them. Moreover, the quality of graciousness does not oppose 
sincerity or ethical concerns, and incorporates them as an intrinsic element of 
any act. I conclude that, like the ancient Greek use of the word, the 
contemporary term ‘gracious’ is both a moral and aesthetic evaluation of an act 
or person.  
The argument proceeds in a circuitous manner. I begin with a customary 
discussion of some of the key theoretical literature on etiquette and its value. 
This literature does not concern its aesthetic attributes, but explores its social 
function and history, and its relationship with morality. As such, it establishes 
the general theoretical framework though which etiquette is understood. This 
framework suggests that etiquette is generally associated with class, but also 
has important social functions as a communicative display. The second section 
raises questions concerning aesthetics and etiquette, and whether the aesthetics 
of form and style replace or conflict with ethical considerations. This section 
introduces discussion from eighteenth century etiquette manuals, as well as 
some of the points that have been raised in passing by philosophers about the 
relationship between etiquette and aesthetics. It identifies the quality of grace 
as a transcendence of rule following, in which the actions have a sincere or 
genuine moral content.  
The third section attempts to give greater substance to this relationship 
between grace, rule following, and ethics through a discussion of the 
Confucian concept of li, and Pierre Bordieu’s concept of a practice. In this 
section I argue that grace is achieved through a mastery of the codes of 
etiquette, in which they become a part of a person’s character as an ethical 
virtue. Mastery of the codes enables a person to improvise with them, creating 
‘an art’ of etiquette. The fourth section provides an example of such 
improvisation, taken from Agatha Christie’s detective fiction The Hollow. This 
example shows how food codes are improvised in order to acknowledge that a 
murder has occurred, and to express regard for the deceased as well as a 
concern for the living. This section illustrates the nature of improvisation upon 
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codes of etiquette, highlighting the sensory nature of food and the manner in 
which it is consumed. The final section of the paper discusses these 
observations, clarifying the relationship between etiquette as a form of rule 
following and aesthetic concerns, and distinguishing etiquette as a social norm 
or form of habitual behaviour from grace, or excellence in the art of etiquette. 
 
Etiquette and Its Value 
The focus on etiquette as conventional ‘rule following’ behaviour by a class of 
people, in particular ‘polite society’, has led many to believe that etiquette is of 
little value. In moral philosophy, rules of etiquette such as wearing a tie at 
dinner may be regarded as ‘silly’, but there are people who believe etiquette 
more sinister than silly because it divides individuals or groups on the basis of 
class and national differences. Conversely, other people see it as being 
fundamentally concerned with the maintenance of political and social virtues 
because it plays important functions in protecting the dignity of individuals and 
maintaining social relations, while falling short of considering it a genuinely 
ethical concern. Two of the most detailed texts on etiquette have been a 
sociological analysis by Norbert Elias and an anthropological analysis by 
Erving Goffman.  
Norbert Elias discusses what is currently termed etiquette—the 
conventional rules of personal behaviour in polite society and the prescribed 
ceremonial of a court—in The Civilising Process: The History of Manners.9 
This book argues that ‘civilisation’ is part of an historical process, and, rather 
than being based on any moral superiority, “bears witness to particular 
structures of human relations, to a particular social structure, and to the 
corresponding forms of behaviour.”10 According to the Oxford Dictionary, the 
term ‘manners’, as an evaluative term (as in the statement that someone has 
‘good manners’) refers to “external social behaviour, estimated according to its 
degree of politeness or conformity to the accepted standards or propriety,” as 
well as being indicative of a particular social class – “habits indicative of good 
breeding.”11 As such, it overlaps with concept of etiquette indicating both 
standards of behaviour, as well as a class.  
Nevertheless, according to Elias, the codes now called manners or 
etiquette can be traced to the concept of civility (civilitas) and a short treatise 
on this topic written by Erasmus in the sixteenth century concerning the 
                                                
9 Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process: The History of Manners, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978 [1939]). 
10 Elias, The Civilising Process, 59. 
11 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “manners.” 
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behaviour and bodily propriety of people in aristocratic society. It dealt with 
aspects of comportment from eating to sleeping, and all aspects of daily life. 
The treatise was initially written as a manual for the education of young men, 
but quickly became popular throughout Europe. 12  Elias argues that, in 
eighteenth century Germany, the middle classes associated courtly ‘civilisation’ 
with superficiality, ceremony, formality, and conformity in contrast to 
naturalness, depth of feeling and thought, sincerity, and the development of 
individuality or the German concept of Kultur. It was against this distinctive, 
courtly, behaviour that Immanuel Kant spoke of Germany being civilised to the 
point of over-burdened by mere “social propriety and decency” and the 
“similitude of morality in the love of honour.”13 In France, Elias reports,  
 
Concepts such as politesse or civilité had, before the concept 
civilisation was formed and established, practically the same 
function as the new concept: to express the self-image of the 
European upper class in relation to others whom its members 
considered simpler or more primitive, and at the same time to 
characterise the specific kind of behaviour through which this upper 
class felt itself different to [and superior to] all simpler and more 
primitive people.14 
 
Nevertheless, in contrast with the German middle classes, the French bourgeois 
intelligentsia adopted the traditional manners of the court in the wake of the 
revolution, seeing in civilisation a standard for the new society that included 
social tact and consideration for others, which, along with the constitution, 
education, and rationality, enabled the liberation of society from what was 
‘barbaric’.15 Part of etiquette’s current disvalue, and its association with class, 
originates in this historical association with courtly etiquette.  
Elias has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the 
social role of etiquette in showing not only that it was historically associated 
with the upper classes, but also how the ideas of the importance of courtesy 
become important in societies’ national identity, and in the manner in which 
groups distinguish themselves from other groups (and establish their sense of 
superiority) through their sense of civility. As such, there is ample support for 
the claim that etiquette is associated with elitism and a particular class structure. 
At the same time, in developing the comparison between the German 
                                                
12 Elias, The Civilising Process, 55. 
13 Elias, The Civilising Process, 9. 
14 Elias, The Civilising Process, 39. 
15 Elias, The Civilising Process, 48. 
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perspective on etiquette (which contrasts ethics, sincerity and etiquette) and the 
French perspective (which found in etiquette a means of contributing tact and 
concern for others within ‘civil society’), Elias developed a useful framework 
for understanding debates about the value of etiquette. 
For instance, many philosophers appear to follow Kant in distinguishing 
ethics from etiquette, and discount its value because it is culturally relative and 
fundamentally concerned with ‘mere’ form. Pojman may be considered 
representative of this perspective, in which there is a sharp contrast between 
ethics and etiquette. Pojman writes, 
 
Custom represents society’s decisions about how we are to dress, 
greet one another, eat, celebrate festivals, carry out transactions, and 
dispose of the dead. 
Whether we greet one another with a handshake, a bow, a 
hug, or a kiss on the cheek differs in different social systems, but 
none has any moral superiority … 
The observance of custom graces our social existence, but it 
is not what social existence is about.16 
 
I assume that by the word ‘graces’ in this context, Pojman is suggesting such 
codes of etiquette ‘ornament’ social relations, but are not fundamental to them. 
Nevertheless, other theorists focus on the themes identified in the French 
reinterpretation of etiquette as a contribution to ‘civil society’. According to 
these authors, cultural relativism and ornamentation does not necessarily 
undermine its social value. Indeed, as Erving Goffman’s seminal work “The 
Nature of Deference and Demeanour” argued, such ornamentation may be 
fundamental to our sense of self, and, contrary to Pojman’s suggestion, 
fundamental to our social existence.  
Goffman highlighted the manner in which rules of etiquette emphasise a 
concern for others, and ritualise forms of respect and value. Like Elias, he 
discussed etiquette in terms of a body of socially-determined, conventional 
ceremonial rules, pointing out that a “ceremonial rule is one which guides 
conduct in matters felt to have secondary or even no significance in their own 
right.”17 But rather than emphasising the function etiquette played in the 
maintenance of the group (a social class or the state) and its boundaries, 
Goffman saw etiquette’s primary importance in the way in which the codes of 
etiquette structure individuals’ social identity, and the way “in which the 
                                                
16 Pojman, Ethical Theory, 3-4.  
17 Goffman, “The Nature of Deference and Demeanor,” 476. 
Etiquette 
 
Aesthetics 23 (1) June 2013, page 75 
	  
person in our urban secular world is allotted a kind of sacredness that is 
displayed and confirmed by symbolic acts.”18  
According to Goffman, social rules create obligations on behaviour, as 
well as expectations in others. Such rules are internalised and, when they are 
side stepped or ignored, may be sanctioned or a cause of anxiety, or be 
responded to with indignation. When a person internalises these rules, they 
come to understand themselves as the kind of person who is treated in a 
particular manner, or the kind of person who behaves in a particular manner; 
being a ‘certain kind of person’ becomes an element of their identity. The 
identity we form and present to others may change in different contexts, 
depending on the role we play in specific situations, for instance, as a family 
member, or a professional, or as an acquaintance, or as a stranger, and these 
situations and scenes create a relativity concerning our ceremonial behaviours 
and identity. 
Goffman analyses these ceremonial behaviours in terms of rituals of 
deference and demeanour. Deference involves rituals of presentation or 
avoidance through which an individual displays appreciation of others, while 
demeanour concerns acts of self-presentation of dress, deportment, and bearing, 
which display that a person considers themself worthy of respect. Goffman 
writes,  
 
The gestures which we sometimes call empty are perhaps in fact the 
fullest things of all. It is therefore important to see that the self is in 
part a ceremonial thing, a sacred object which must be treated with 
proper ritual care and in turn must be presented in a proper light to 
others. As a means through which this self is established, the 
individual acts with proper demeanor while in contact with others 
and is treated by others with deference.19 
 
The social function and value of etiquette is that it provides opportunities for 
these ritualised displays through small ‘inconsequential’ gestures that require 
little effort, but through which we acknowledge respect for other people and 
their membership of the social group.  
Similarly, a few philosophers have explored the social function of 
civility and concluded that it has important moral and political functions. 
Cheshire Calhoun argues that the display of civility signals a person’s 
willingness to contribute in social practices such as political dialogue, funerals 
and driving; and, for those people in different societies who are not coerced 
                                                
18 Goffman, “The Nature of Deference and Demeanor,” 473. 
19 Goffman, “The Nature of Deference and Demeanor,” 497. 
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into sharing social life, civility may be a precondition to enter into cooperative 
ventures.20 Among the moral virtues of civility, she includes the way in which 
it supports self-esteem “by offering token reminders that we are regarded as 
worth respecting, tolerating, and considering” as well as the protection of 
socially disesteemed groups against “the emotional exhaustion of having to 
cope with others’ displays of hatred, aversion, and disapproval.”21 This raises a 
question of whether there is a difference between the etiquette of civility and 
substantive moral virtues such as tolerance and respect. Calhoun has argued 
that civility must be considered a distinct virtue rather than an example of 
tolerance or respect, because civility is fundamentally a form of 
communicative display: 
 
[W]hat makes being civil different from being respectful, 
considerate, or tolerant, is that civility always involves a display of 
respect, tolerance, or considerateness. Thus civility is an essentially 
communicative form of moral conduct. In addition, because 
communicating our moral attitudes is central to civility, being 
genuinely civil—unlike, say, being genuinely considerate or 
genuinely tolerant—requires that we follow whatever the socially 
established norms are for showing people considerateness, tolerance, 
or respect. Only because there are such generally agreed upon, often 
codified, social rules for what counts as respectful, considerate, and 
tolerant behavior can we successfully communicate our moral 
attitudes toward others. Those rules create a common language for 
conveying the attitudes of respect, willingness to tolerate differences, 
and consideration.22  
 
Goffman also explores the manner in which these codes or rules of 
conduct create communicative codes that display our attitudes towards others, 
arguing that the deference codes represent the way in which identities are 
confirmed – both for the person who expects certain kinds of deference, and 
the person for whom acting in a certain way is an obligation.23 Deference codes 
include rituals such as salutations, invitations, compliments, and minor services. 
Through these, “the recipient is told that … others are, or seek to be, involved 
with him and with his personal … concerns.”24 Such behaviour, Goffman 
                                                
20 Cheshire Calhoun, “The Virtue of Civility,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 
(2000): 251-275, 266. 
21 Calhoun, “The Virtue of Civility,” 260. 
22 Calhoun, “The Virtue of Civility,” 260. 
23 Goffman, “The Nature of Deference and Demeanor,” 475. 
24 Goffman, “The Nature of Deference and Demeanor,” 486. 
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argues, contains a kind of pledge to treat others in a certain way in the future, 
affirming “that the expectations and obligations of the recipient, both 
substantive and ceremonial, will be allowed and supported by the actor”25 and 
that they will be enabled to maintain dignity or face. The deference codes, 
which are generally honorific and politely toned, may convey appreciation of 
the person to whom they are addressed in ways that are more complimentary 
than the actor’s true sentiment might warrant. Low regard for a person may be 
concealed by extra punctiliousness of the observance of the defence codes, and 
it is generally recognised that the recipient should not take the actor literally, 
and should rest content with the show of appreciation.26  
Yet Goffman also argues that rules of etiquette are not merely a form of 
facade, but also a means of self-expression. He provides one way in which 
character may be expressed is through codes of demeanour: 
 
In our society, the “well” or “properly” demeaned individual 
displays such attributes as: discretion and sincerity; modesty in 
claims regarding self; sportsmanship; command of speech and 
physical movements; self-control over his emotions, his appetites, 
and his desires; poise under pressure; and so forth. When we attempt 
to analyze the qualities conveyed through demeanor, certain themes 
become apparent. The well-demeaned individual possesses the 
attributes popularly associated with “character training” or 
“socialization,” these being implanted when a neophyte of any kind 
is housebroken.27  
 
The character presented through an individual’s demeanour and how they 
observe (or do not observe) of codes of etiquette may also be evaluated with 
descriptors that indicate aesthetic qualities such as the terms gracious, simple, 
modest, gruff, wild, or grand. Such descriptions may be considered to be ‘thick’ 
in the sense that describe not only character, but also double as aesthetic 
descriptors and moral evaluations. 
In summary, the vast majority of the literature on etiquette is concerned 
with its relationship with ethics and social class. Etiquette is historically 
associated with the upper classes and used as a form of social distinction. But 
this is not its only function, nor should we undermine its importance in our 
lives. We construct our identities and develop our character in relation to 
rituals of demeanour and deference. The codes of etiquette that enforce civility 
are a form of egalitarianism that can be understood as ‘levelling up’, protecting 
                                                
25 Goffman, “The Nature of Deference and Demeanor,” 480. 
26 Goffman, “The Nature of Deference and Demeanor,” 479. 
27 Goffman, “The Nature of Deference and Demeanor,” 489. 
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individuals against indignity and humiliation. But in addition, how the codes 
are expressed is communicative of character, which may be described in 
aesthetic terms. 
There is also a third perspective on the value of etiquette that is worth 
noting in this context. The writers of manuals of manners may not understand 
etiquette as mere displays of respect or civility, but may believe etiquette to 
have substantive moral value. For instance, Martin and Stent place ethics and 
etiquette on a continuum of social rules that create order. They point out that in 
situations where conflict is greatest, such as in legal disputes, the structures of 
etiquette are at their most formal in order to constrain passion and 
disagreement. In addition, they emphasise that the codes of etiquette do not 
necessarily exclude others, and that some rules of etiquette act to protect the 
disadvantaged. Rules of etiquette such as noblesse oblige exist in order to 
alleviate the vulnerability of the poor to exploitation and general disregard.28 
Such writers of manuals of manners and etiquette, however, are of primary 
interest because in this tradition of writing a contrast may be drawn between 
‘true’ manners, which are based on ethical principles, or on virtues, and 
etiquette as a form of display. This tradition directly discusses the relationship 
between etiquette and aesthetics, and disvalues etiquette for that reason. In the 
following section I will explore this literature and the relationship between 
aesthetics and etiquette.  
 
Etiquette and Aesthetics  
The anthropologist Shirley Yeung’s survey of American manuals from the 
nineteenth century showed that most writers associated ethics with ‘manners’, 
and etiquette with superficial aesthetic concerns. “In the ideal, the practice of 
manners was aimed at cultivating habitual social graces that would become 
natural and authentic with time.”29 As Yeung comments in relation to the 
manual writers, “[t]his was a vision in which speech could infiltrate the heart 
and where sincerity was as much a perfectable capacity as it was a 
characteristic of the already virtuous.”30 This is a fundamental element of 
virtue ethics. A virtue is not simply an isolated act, it is a character trait or 
disposition that is well entrenched. It is the way a person habitually behaves.31  
                                                
28 Martin and Stent, “I Think; Therefore I Thank.” 
29 Yeung, “Natural Manners,” 236. 
30 Yeung, “Natural Manners,” 248. 
31  Rosalind Hurthouse, “Virtue Ethics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
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Those people who are more concerned with display than good manners 
were described as ‘posers’ in the 1852 manual The Principles of Courtesy. A 
poser’s  
 
concern is not whether an action be right, but whether it be 
gracefully performed; not whether a remark be true, but whether it 
be elegantly expressed … Since manners consist much in appearance, 
those who are anxious to preserve their place in the good opinion of 
others are tempted to exhibit symbol when they cannot show the 
substance … But manners can never be divorced from morals.32  
 
Another manual, Laws and ByLaws (1869) points out the absurdity of social 
interactions in which  
 
a regard for formal mannerism takes the place of the easy grace that 
is the mark of true politeness which [is] habitual [and] never 
offensively prominent … The mere form over-riding and hiding the 
spirit which should control and guide it … must inevitably produce 
discomfort … Nature is made the slave of Art, instead of Art taking 
its proper place as the handmaid to Nature.33 
 
On the one hand, such writers can be seen as exemplars of Elias’ suggestion 
that social classes distinguish themselves from other groups on the basis of 
their manners, as the writers in this tradition identify manners with morality 
rather than courtly behaviour, but they are also exemplars of the sharp 
distinction that some theorists draw between ethics and etiquette. Ethics, or 
manners, are ‘natural’, while etiquette is primarily concerned with display, and 
aesthetics.  
Despite the sharp distinction drawn between aesthetics—represented by 
etiquette—and true morality, such authors also think that the aesthetics of 
etiquette may be compatible with ‘true morality’. For instance, one author 
advises to his readers, “Do not look upon the rules of etiquette as deceptions. 
They are just as often vehicles for expression of sincere feelings as they are the 
mask to conceal the want of it,” and another observes that while etiquette may 
“cloak what is hollow, unmeaning and false” it may “also drape gracefully 
what is true and important.”34  
A stronger claim for the role of aesthetics and etiquette in ethical life is 
made by Friedrich von Schiller in the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of 
                                                
32 Cited in Yeung, “Natural Manners”, 242.  
33 Cited in Yeung, “Natural Manners,” 243.  
34 Cited in Yeung, “Natural Manners,” 243. 
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Man (1794). For Schiller, a concern with beauty brings harmony into society 
by fostering harmony in the individual. Schiller suggests that aesthetics must 
be considered the foundation of society, as only beauty can unite individuals in 
their rational moral freedom and the sensual world, and create harmony in the 
state. While Schiller’s main focus is on art and design, he includes manners 
and politeness in the category of aesthetics, and focuses on demeanour and the 
importance of presentation. On the matter of the aesthetics of etiquette Schiller 
writes: 
 
Nothing is more common than to hear depreciators of the times utter 
these paltry complaints – that all solidity has disappeared from the 
world, and that essence is neglected for semblance. Though I feel by 
no means called upon to defend this age against these reproaches, I 
must say that the wide application of these criticisms shows that they 
attach blame to the age, not only on the score of the false, but also of 
the frank appearance … Not only do they attack the artificial 
colouring that hides truth and replaces reality, but also the beneficent 
appearance that fills a vacuum and clothes poverty; and they even 
attack the ideal appearance that ennobles a vulgar reality. Their strict 
sense of truth is rightly offended by the falsity of manners; 
unfortunately, they class politeness in this category. It displeases 
them that the noisy and showy so often eclipse true merit, but they 
are no less shocked that appearance is also demanded from merit, 
and that a real substance does not dispense with an agreeable form. 
They regret the cordiality, the energy, and solidity of ancient times; 
they would restore with them ancient coarseness, heaviness, and the 
old Gothic profusion.35 
 
In this passage, Schiller speaks of the possibility for etiquette to act as a cloak 
over reality, or a form of insincerity. Yet, he suggests that an aesthetic 
demeanour may also be demanded of actors. He praises manners that are artful, 
while not overtaken by aesthetic considerations. Aesthetics is appropriate in the 
moral realm, 
 
in proportion as this appearance will be æsthetical, that is, an 
appearance that does not try to make up for reality, nor requires to be 
made up for by it. The æsthetical appearance can never endanger the 
truth of morals: wherever it seems to do so the appearance is not 
æsthetical.36  
                                                
35 Friedrich von Schiller, Letters upon the Æsthetic Education of Man, 1794, Letter 
XXVII, accessed October 3, 2012, http://www.bartleby.com/32/505.html. 
36 von Schiller, Letters upon the Æsthetic Education of Man. 
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This suggests that he thinks that a genuine concern for aesthetics does not mask 
or hide sincere feeling as such behaviour itself would be unaesthetic, or ugly.  
More recently, the aesthetic quality of etiquette has been commented on 
by Arnold Berleant in an essay, “Ideas for a Social Aesthetic”. In this essay, 
Berleant follows Schiller’s thought that it is a concern with beauty that gives 
people their social character. Berleant observes,  
 
Proper etiquette is ordinarily interpreted as rule-governed behaviour, 
as conventions that are devoid of any real content but that serve to 
facilitate social interactions by establishing regular patterns. Yet 
there are occasions when the cultivation of such behaviour assumes a 
certain grace, when the participants delight in the skills involved and 
at the same time manage to introduce genuine human content into 
what is usually empty ritual. When this occurs, discovery, perception, 
reciprocity and other aesthetic features overcome the sterile 
formalism often associated with etiquette.37 
 
In this passage, Berleant suggests that etiquette or ritual is not necessarily 
aesthetic, in that it may remain at the level of formal rule-governed behaviour. 
Yet there seems no reason to suggest that rule-governed behaviour, such as 
protocol and ceremony, is not also aesthetic. For instance, my earlier examples 
of formal ceremonies such as the opening of parliament, or a royal wedding 
(which are contained within Goffman’s definition of etiquette) follow rules and 
are also aesthetic events in terms of being grand or splendid. Berleant also 
suggests that social aesthetics, like the appreciation of beauty in the arts, 
involves a selective, restricted attention while judgement is suspended.38 This 
approach to social aesthetics must be incorrect however, as aesthetic 
appearances do not merely adorn experience but also structure our 
understanding of our situation. 39  One does not ‘appreciate’ grandeur by 
withholding judgement; one is awed by it. The ‘splendid’ wedding is ‘glorious’; 
a person is uplifted by it. In such rituals and events, an observer is engaged in 
the ritual, and emotionally swept up by its aesthetic structure. Despite these 
criticisms, Berleant intuitively appears correct in his suggestion that the 
                                                
37 Arnold Berleant, “Ideas for a Social Aesthetic,” in The Aesthetics of Everyday 
Life, eds Andrew Light and Jonathon M. Smith (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005), 31-32. 
38 Berleant, “Ideas for a Social Aesthetic,” 26. 
39 Elizabeth Burns Coleman, “Aesthetics as a Cross-Cultural Concept,” Literature 
& Aesthetics 15:1 (2005): 57-78. 
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aesthetic quality of grace is an achievement of interpersonal relations that 
transcends mere rule following and introduces genuine feeling and content. 
While Schiller and Berleant note the connection between aesthetics and 
etiquette, and recognise grace as an accomplishment, such casual observances 
do little to increase our understanding of the nature of graciousness and its 
relationship to ethics and etiquette. What needs to be explored is the difference 
between what Schiller referred to as ‘aesthetical appearance’ and hollow or 
insincere posing, and the relationship between ethics and aesthetics within 
etiquette. If the rules of etiquette can be followed by anyone, and not all rule 
following is gracious, then we need to go deeper than these observations about 
the relationship between etiquette and aesthetics to give the concept of 
graciousness any substance. Berleant’s conception of grace is suggestive of a 
way forward here because it focusses on the skills of etiquette, and yet 
transcends rule following. This idea is explored in the next section by a detour 
through Confucian ethics, in which social rules and spontaneous behaviour are 
not seen as necessarily in conflict. What this exploration will show is that 
graciousness is concerned not with the observance of rules, but a mastery of 
and creative improvisation on them. Moreover, it becomes apparent that the 
genuine human content Berleant discusses is a characteristic of virtue ethics 
and of gracious behaviour. 
 
Li, Grace, and Improvisation 
In Confucian ethics, li (禮) is generally connected with the rules governing 
ceremonial and ritual behaviour, but in the Analects it also sets out principles 
of personal behaviour and social interactions including rules of etiquette such 
as the relation between subject and ruler, which ceremonial cap to wear, and 
when to prostrate oneself. According to Jiyuan Yu, “Li is … the totality of 
socially acceptable behaviour patterns and lifestyles, including both moral and 
non-moral norms. It corresponds to Aristotle’s ethos (social custom), that is, 
the traditional social mores and cultural settings.”40 Li should be followed in 
rules of deference, as well as one’s demeanour, in looking, speaking, listening, 
and moving. Li is also an aesthetic concept. In Book I of the Analects, this 
connection is made explicit within a speech by Yu Tzu who says, “Of all the 
things brought about by the rites, harmony is the most valuable. Of all the ways 
of the Former Kings, this is the most beautiful.”41 
                                                
40 Jiyuan Yu, “Virtue: Confucius and Aristotle,” Philosophy East and West 48:2 
(1988): 323-347, 326. 
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The nature of li, however, presents a puzzle, as also in the Analects, 
Confucius’ disciple Yu suggests, “In uses of decorum, it is naturalness that is 
of value.”42 Joel Kupperman explores how to interpret this idea of naturalness, 
for it is not simply sincerity of feeling, or of expressing one’s emotions. The 
form of self-expression is through the use of decorum and conventional codes 
of behaviour. His clue in interpreting the term ‘naturalness’ in this context 
arises from a conversation in Analects XII, VIII, in which Chi Tzu-Ch’eng, an 
official, remarks, “For a man of high character to be natural is quite sufficient; 
what need is there of art to make him such?” The reply from one of Confucius’ 
disciples, Tzu Kung, is that “Art, as it were, is nature, as nature, so to speak, is 
art.”43 Kupperman argues that the paradox of saying that nature is art can be 
solved when we stop thinking of education as placing a veneer over nature, but 
rather as transforming people, and changing what comes naturally to them.44 
He explains this through an analogy with musical composition, and the skill of 
a composer such as Beethoven. Despite the popular opinions that such people 
express their emotions spontaneously through their art, such expression cannot 
be achieved without rigorous training and practice. This, he argues is true of 
any discipline, whether it is music, history, philosophy, or literary criticism. 
Once a discipline is mastered, performance in the discipline ‘comes naturally’ 
despite the fact that the training requires constraint. What is developed through 
education is a new nature, and a different kind of naturalness.45 The difference 
between this analogy and the Confucian master is that we think of education in 
terms of discrete aspects of one’s life, while, for Confucius, education 
concerned a person’s character and the whole of life.46  
Kupperman argues that excellence in li should not be understood as a 
matter of mere rule following, as while li is concerned with tradition, it also 
needs to be adapted as circumstances require. The ‘correct’ or ‘right’ solution 
in a difficult moral situation is often not covered by rules, and a person with 
mastery of li will behave naturally, and appropriately, in these circumstances as 
mastery of li involves harmony of thoughts, words, and actions.47 Kupperman 
argues that the person with such mastery will display as much individuality as 
the works of an artist such as Beethoven, and be identifiable by their behaviour, 
“Just as almost any composition by Beethoven has that in it which enables the 
                                                
42  Cited in Joel Kupperman, “Confucius and the Problem of Naturalness,” 
Philosophy East and West 18:3 (1968): 175-185, 176. 
43 Cited in Kupperman, “Confucius and the Problem of Naturalness,” 179. 
44 Kupperman, “Confucius and the Problem of Naturalness,” 180.  
45 Kupperman, “Confucius and the Problem of Naturalness,” 180. 
46 Kupperman, “Confucius and the Problem of Naturalness,” 181.  
47 Kupperman, “Confucius and the Problem of Naturalness,” 184.  
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listener to recognise it as something by Beethoven, so ideally any word or 
action on the part of an accomplished Confucian worthy should have in it 
which makes it recognizably related to his entire character.”48 This description 
of the relationship of the mastery of li and naturalness seems apt, although it 
over-emphasises the relationship with character, for a habitual demeanour 
provides (even to those people with poor skills) character, as this simply 
concerns how one applies the codes of civility. As was argued in relation to 
Goffman’s idea of demeanour, when we say a person is simple or grand or wild 
or gruff, these descriptors refer to a person’s presentation of self through the 
codes. 
Yet the description of the mastery of li is similar to the idea presented by 
writers of manuals that through practice of etiquette a person will develop 
consideration and respect for others. A completely virtuous person does not 
struggle to do what they should do, or do it only when others are watching, but 
rather chooses actions that accord with their values.49 It requires practice to 
develop a demeanour that displays these concerns, and mastery of this practice 
affects one’s character in that the codes become ‘natural’. A person with 
greatness has both internalised the conventional codes, and displays mastery of 
them through spontaneous moral behaviour that is appropriate to a given 
situation.  
One way of redescribing how naturalness is consistent with 
conventionality that may be more acceptable to social scientists is through 
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of a practice. A practice is something of which we 
are not wholly conscious, but are governed by practical logic.50 In his text In 
Other Words, Bourdieu explains this idea of a practical logic as something like 
the feel of a game: 
 
The practical mastery of the logic or of the imminent necessity of a 
game – a mastery acquired of experience of the game, and one which 
works outside conscious control or discourse (in the way that, for 
instance, techniques of the body do).51 
 
Richard Jenkins remarks on the similarity between this idea and Goffman’s 
ideas about the presentation of the self in social life as a kind of theatre.52 An 
important characteristic of practical logic is its fluidity and indeterminacy, in 
                                                
48 Kupperman, “Confucius and the Problem of Naturalness,” 184. 
49 Hurthouse, “Virtue Ethics.” 
50 Richard Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu (London: Routledge, 1992), 69-70.  
51 Cited in Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, 70. 
52 Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, 70. 
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Bourdieu’s words, “the “art” of necessary improvisation which defines 
excellence.”53 Social life, according to Bordieu, is not accomplished on the 
basis of rules, recipes, and normative models. This is not possible, as one 
cannot have a rule for every occasion; it is not that people choose to improvise, 
they have no other choice.54 Just as in the example of Confucian ethics above, 
Bourdieu describes the accomplishment of social interaction as a kind of 
“second nature.”55  
Jenkins raises a number of important objections to this characterisation 
of a practice, pointing out that games do have rules that make certain actions 
permissible while others are not, and that, like games, the rules of social life 
are often explicitly taught as well as implicitly learnt. He criticises Bourdieu of 
overemphasising the idea of competence at the expense of understanding the 
rules, stating that “most people, most of the time, exhibit, at best, competence 
rather than excellence in their dealing with others. Bourdieu does not help us 
understand the absence of excellence in social interaction, let alone the 
ubiquity of incompetence.” 56  These criticisms of Bordieu’s claims about 
excellence appear well justified, explaining, as they do, the need for manuals of 
etiquette.  
But the relationship between improvisation and social rules is important 
here as mastery of the rules, and improvisation with them as a form of self-
expression, is fundamental to understanding excellence in relation to etiquette. 
In order to illustrate this point, it is worthwhile considering situations in which 
formal ceremonies involving etiquette are disrupted, and improvisation is 
necessary. My example for this is taken from Agatha Christie’s 1946 novel, 
The Hollow. 
 
A Disruption of the Luncheon Code 
 
It was the habit of the Angkatells to invite guests for one o’clock, 
and on fine days they had cocktails and sherry in the small pavilion 
by the swimming pool. Lunch itself was scheduled for one-thirty, by 
which time the most unpunctual of guests should have managed to 
arrive, which permitted Lady Angkatell’s excellent cook to embark 
on soufflés and such accurately-timed delicacies without too much 
trepidation.57  
                                                
53 Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, 71. 
54 Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, 71. 
55 Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, 72. 
56 Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, 71. 
57 Agatha Christie, The Hollow [1946] (Glasgow: Fontana Books, 1963), 69. 
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Hercule Poirot had “dressed” for the occasion, and entered by the front gate, as 
was “appropriate to guests from outside the family.” He arrived at The Hollow 
to find a man lying by the pool bleeding to death, with a woman standing over 
him holding a gun. A number of other participants in the lunch party stood 
around, each having approached the pool from different directions. Sir Henry 
Angkatell (the host) arrived just as the man died. Taking charge of the situation, 
Sir Henry asked the butler to call the police. The dying man was John, and it 
was his wife Gerda who held the gun. The group of people cleared as Gerda 
was taken to the house to lie down, and others retired from the scene. Poirot, 
who had not been introduced to the other people at the party, inquired about 
John and Gerdra’s identities.  
 
“Oh, of course,” Lady Angkatell turned to him in a quick apology. 
“One forgets—but then one doesn’t exactly introduce people—not 
when somebody has just been killed … ”58 
 
In this exchange it is clear that a rule of etiquette has been broken, in 
particular, a deference ritual. Lady Angkatell has forgotten to introduce her 
guest on his arrival. But, on reflection, it seems to her that the situation actually 
demands that the protocol should be put aside. Introducing the guest to the 
party, over the body of a dying man, would be inappropriate. Lady Angkatell’s 
main concern is that appropriate behaviour should be followed at all times.  
A more significant issue arises in terms of the question of what, and 
whether, the party should eat. 
 
“Half past two,” said Lady Angkatell … 
 
“You know, Midge, I still feel one ought to do something about 
lunch. It seems, of course, quite heartless to sit down around the 
table as if nothing had happened. But afterall, M. Poirot was asked to 
lunch – and he is probably hungry … And I must say that though I 
really do not feel like eating myself, Henry and Edward must be 




“What does one do about Gerda, do you think? Something on a tray? 
A little strong soup, perhaps?” 
 
                                                
58 Christie, The Hollow, 73-74. 
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Gudgeon [the butler] entered, inclined himself confidentially and 
spoke in a suitably muted voice. “I have placed sandwiches and 




“Really,” said Lady Angkatell as Gudgeon left the room. “Gudgeon 
is wonderful… He always knows the right thing to do. Some really 
substantial sandwiches are as good as lunch – and nothing heartless 
about them, if you know what I mean.”59 
 
In the following chapter, the household must manage the evening meal.  
 
They had the cold ducks for supper. After the cold ducks there was a 
caramel custard which, Lady Angkatell said, showed just the right 
feeling on the part of Mrs Medway [the cook], and showed great 
delicacy. 
 “We are only, as she knows, moderately fond of caramel 
custard. There would be something very gross, just after the death of 
a friend, to eat one’s favourite pudding. But caramel custard is so 
easy—slippery if you know what I mean—and then one leaves a 
little on one’s plate.”60  
 
Agatha Christie’s novels are self-consciously full of the detail of 
people’s lives, of what they eat and wear, and how they deport themselves. At 
times, as with her description of Lady Angkatell, the characters themselves 
display astute self-consciousness. Lady Angatell lives her life as if there were 
always an observer of it. Every action is ritualistic and formal, and follows a 
code of etiquette. The living of life as if there were an observer suggests that 
this code of etiquette is fully internalised. At the same time, she is conscious 
that these codes must be improvised upon where there is no precedent. Their 
behaviour must match the gravity of the event in which they find themselves, 
and failure to behave appropriately would be met by moral censure for their 
want of feeling by that imaginary observer.  
Food codes become the main means through which their response to the 
murder is expressed. Food, as Mary Douglas has pointed out, is “a practice” 
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Elizabeth Coleman 
 
Aesthetics 23 (1) June 2013, page 88 
	  
with a series of events throughout the day, but also throughout the year.61 
There are special events, such as birthdays; as well as religious events with 
feasts and fasts; and special food, such as that for weddings or funerals. Each 
meal and event has its own structure. The meal Mrs Angaktell had planned 
followed a formal dinner code. Douglas would describe this meal in terms of a 
primary code as F (first) S (second) M (main) W (sweets) Z (savoury), and as a 
secondary code as Fb:1.2 (hors d’oevres) S (soufflé), and Mb:3.2 (duck). 
Christie did not mention what the sweets or savoury dishes were to be. Alcohol 
and drinks were presumably similarly structured, with cocktails followed 
perhaps with wine, desert wine, coffee, and port. Glasses and cutlery would be 
structured for each course, and then there would be a seating plan. Generally, at 
a formal dinner, the guests are ordered in a structured pattern with the most 
important sitting close to the host. There must be a mix of males and females, 
and the seating plan must also allow for personalities and interests. Guests are 
expected to speak to the people seated on both sides of them during the meal. 
As Bourdieu suggests, this practice or code is not necessarily explicit, or fully 
described. Douglas states that her grammar of the family meal structure shows 
how “long and tedious the exhaustive analysis would be to read,” let alone how 
“taxing to record and observe.”62 At the same time, most people implicitly 
understand the patterns and codes for food, even though the codes they use 
may be less elaborate than the one in this example. 
After the murder, the code for the planned meal is no longer appropriate. 
There is no precedent. They cannot go to an etiquette book, or even personal 
experience, in order to know what to do. Mrs Angatell’s servants improvise. 
The new arrangements need to acknowledge the gravity of the event, 
accommodate the needs of the guests and the family members, as well as 
accommodating the needs of the person accused of his murder (who is also the 
bereaved). The food served is now informal, to be taken from the coffee table 
as people require. As it was lunchtime, the meal is light – sandwiches and 
coffee (in Douglas’s complex taxonomy, La3.1), and there is no seating plan. 
The meal is eaten informally, by hand. The accused/bereaved is provided with 
soup (Fa:1.1 according to the secondary code) and the evening meal is 
simplified to a primary code of MZ, or maybe FMZ.  
This event can also be described in Goffman’s terms of deference and 
demeanour. Here it is the situation, the murder of a friend, which requires 
deference. It is this fact that means Mrs Ankatell’s failure to introduce Poirot is 
                                                
61 Mary Douglas, “Deciphering a Meal,” Implicit Meanings: Selected Essays in 
Anthropology (London: Routledge, 1999). 
62 Douglas, “Deciphering a Meal,” 235. 
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not merely excused, but that introductions themselves at that point would have 
been inexcusable. Moreover, the participants in the situation must display a 
particular demeanour; they should not enjoy food too much, or eat too heartily. 
The sensuousness of the food, such as its temperature, consistency, and 
delicacy is also important. The meal is simplified and food is eaten cold, other 
dishes as leftovers. The desert of the evening meal is slippery. The 
accused/bereaved, who presumably is in shock on either account, receives food 
that can be swallowed easily (soup), and is at the same time nourishing and 
comforting. The demeanour of the act of eating becomes important. Heartily 
enjoying one’s favourite desert after a murder would be uncaring; satisfying 
bodily requirements and displaying moderation, both in enjoyment and 
consumption, is not. One is reminded of the withdrawal of sensation at specific 
times. For instance, the renunciation of something desired in Lent, and the 
denial of colour and gaiety in bereavement as an expression of sorrow. Clearly, 
the aesthetic properties of the environment, and of the self, are manipulated in 
order to express the sentiments or response to the situation in which the 
participants are acting. In the next, final, section, these ideas will be formalised 
into an analysis of the relationship between etiquette, aesthetics, and ethics, and 
the achievement of grace. 
 
Etiquette and Grace: Appropriateness and Fit  
There are several important points to be drawn from this example of the lunch. 
First, before the codes of the lunch were disrupted, there were clear codes of 
etiquette that were being followed. These codes or rules had aesthetic 
dimensions and goals, as well as social ones. Poirot had “dressed”—
presumably he was in a suit (and tie) and his shoes were clean—so one may 
assume other participants at the lunch were similarly attired formally. He 
arrived through the front gate to express his social distance from the party. The 
Angkatells had paid attention to the context in which the various elements of 
the meal were to be taken. Cocktails were consumed by the pool in a secluded 
garden. The order of events had been organised so that the cook could prepare 
numerous delicacies that required great skill and perfect timing. There were 
numerous dishes to be served that had been planned with great care in relation 
to texture and taste, and which were to be consumed in a certain order. Poirot 
would have been introduced, but for the murder (the other members of the 
party knew each other), and introductions would have been made only between 
those people who were eating together – there was no suggestion, for example, 
that Poirot would have been introduced to the butler or to the cook.  
Hence, the introductions produced both social inclusion and exclusion of 
the group, as did the act of eating. As we know these behaviours followed rules 
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or codes, we can safely say that it was ‘normal’ or everyday rule-following that 
aimed at achieving a specific aesthetic quality. No doubt, the Ankatells had 
intended to organise an ‘elegant’ lunch. Its elegance would have consisted in 
the dress, the food, the context, the table settings, the manner in which people 
held their knives and forks. All of these concern physical and sensory 
characteristics. Failure, or inelegance, would involve the cook’s skills failing, 
people not dressing or not eating correctly, or participants refusing to make 
conversation or sulking – that is, refusing to act in a manner that was 
appropriate.  
And clearly, in this example, we are discussing a certain social class – a 
class that has a cook and a butler and a swimming pool. Any participants who 
had not been trained how to comport themselves would have been able to 
consult a manual – a guide to etiquette no doubt. But I imagine that the 
participants would have sufficient skills to do without these manuals, and 
would regularly or habitually engage in the practice of a weekend lunch. This 
is consistent with everyone at the lunch behaving with a great deal of 
insincerity. They might express delight in food they hated, find each-others’ 
conversation boring but feign interest, display hospitality while secretly 
wishing the guest go away. And this disingenuity might also be habitual. So it 
appears that Calhoun and Goffman are correct in discussing this as a form of 
performance or display. But at the same time, a degree of sincerity or warmth 
would be necessary for the lunch to be delightful, or convivial. The degree to 
which it was this would depend on the extent to which all the participants 
willingly engaged in their various roles, and engaged in them skilfully. So we 
can conclude, against Berleant, that normal etiquette always has an aesthetic 
dimension, even if its aesthetic aims are not always entirely successful; and 
that part of the achievement of this aim involves a degree of sincerity on the 
part of the actors. Good manners appear to require the internalisation of codes 
so that behaviour is practiced and performed ‘easily’. This involves a capacity 
to improvise on social codes as the situation requires. The aim of such 
improvisation is to ensure that the actions fit the situation. The concept of fit or 
appropriateness is a complex aesthetic quality, not dissimilar to the complex 
aesthetic qualities of proportion or symmetry. The capacity to improvise does 
not mean that major improvisation is always necessary. It is not every day that 
one’s lunch party is disrupted by a murder.  
The difference between gracious behaviour and mere observance of the 
codes of etiquette (or even good manners) is that graciousness not only 
achieves this ‘fit’ with the situation, but that it sincerely expresses the moral 
values of the actor. Social grace is the achievement of excellence in this regard. 
The actor expresses themselves through the adaptation of the codes and their 
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aesthetic qualities in a manner that others recognise as skilful and morally 
appropriate, while at the same time recognising that the sentiments expressed 
are not ‘an act’ or performance. Schiller may have been exaggerating when he 
suggests that aesthetic considerations can never eclipse the truth of morality, 
but he is correct in saying that failure to fit the aesthetics to the occasion will 
be a form of moral failure. The description of an act as graceful or gracious 
therefore suggests that it is both morally appropriate and aesthetically 
accomplished. It is a complex term on the borders of aesthetics and ethics, 
implying that an action that is moral is also expressed aesthetically, and that an 
aesthetic display contains sincere or truthful content.  
In conclusion, etiquette is not only a mechanism through which we 
communicate our attitudes to others, but, through the moderation of ourselves, 
may become the kind of person we wish to be. As a communicative display, 
etiquette involves learning (implicitly or explicitly) and following social norms 
concerning deference and demeanour. Expression of one’s attitudes is a learnt 
skill that involves the manipulation of the aesthetic qualities not only of the self 
but also of the environment. Nevertheless, the character training involved in 
this process of forming habits and in the moderation of the self also a means of 
achieving genuine moral virtue. A person may on occasion act graciously, 
without, on the whole, being a gracious person. Similarly, a gracious person 
may occasionally accidentally fail. An act that is gracious suggests not only 
that the social codes have been internalised, and that their mastery enables a 
person to improvise with them as a means of self-expression in response to a 
situation, but that their behaviour is both morally responsive and sincere. In 
this respect, the evaluation that someone, or a particular act, is gracious in both 
a moral and an aesthetic evaluation. Etiquette is one means through which we 
may express ourselves as social ‘actors’, but it is also a means by which we 
may create for ourselves an aesthetic and moral life, in which, at least 
sometimes, we may achieve grace. 
